Judicial Intelligence Oversight in Kenya : Prospects and Challenges
Keywords:
Intelligence oversight, secrecy, accountability, constitutionalism, judiciaryAbstract
Kenya, like other democratic states, has embraced various forms of intelligence oversight, including judicial mechanisms as a means to enhancing accountability in the intelligence agency. The structure and function of intelligence oversight is tied to the specific context of a nation, influenced by its unique culture, history, constitutionalism and the prevailing political landscape. This context is continually evolving and adapting to the ever-changing security landscape. These factors, along with the inherent secrecy surrounding intelligence operations, necessitate an examination of prospects and challenges for judicial intelligence oversight. This study sought to establish how judicial intelligence oversight has been operationalised in Kenya; the nature of interactions between the judiciary and intelligence, and the influence of judicial oversight on the execution of the intelligence mandate. The research employed purposive sampling and utilised primary data gathered through key informants interviews and in-depth interviews. Secondary data was derived from a comprehensive literature review, thematically analysed and presented in narrative form. The study established limited public understanding of judicial oversight processes despite Kenya’s robust legal frameworks underpinning such processes. Besides the secrecy of intelligence operations, judicial oversight is restricted by the fact that inquiries are case-specific, making such mechanisms reactive and limited to litigation before the court. Further, it was found that the judiciary has been scrutinising intelligence procedures to determine compliance with legal demands as well as safeguarding intelligence secrets. However, the extent of this scrutiny depends on the prevailing political regime. The research recommends enhanced awareness of judicial oversight mechanisms as well as greater transparency in judicial oversight of intelligence efforts to make them more visible to the public.
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